In order to favor shareholder investment over a longer time horizon, Italy introduced loyalty shares in late 2014, which allow double voting rights after a twoyear continuous holding period. Italian listed firms which adopted loyalty shares (about 20 percent of those listed in the main market segment) are significantly more likely to be controlled by families and have a more concentrated ownership structure. We report no evidence of a negative market reaction at the announcement's adoption, nor a reduction in holdings by institutional investors, despite institutional investors generally voting against the introduction of loyalty shares. Notwithstanding the short period of analysis, we find some evidence that controlling shareholders reduce their holdings after loyalty shares are adopted.
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Introduction
The dramatic increase in assets managed by institutional investors has heightened the short-term pressure exercised by the stock market on listed company managers (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2018; Asker et al., 2015; Brochet et al., 2015; Edmans et al., 2017) . This short-term pressure has led managers, regulators, and politicians to discuss and examine solutions aimed at promoting longer holding periods and, therefore, long-term behavior.
Among several proposals, the 2012 European Commission's Action Plan on "Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union" suggested the introduction of instruments, like loyalty shares, to stimulate long-term investments by shareholders and counteract short-termism, viewed as one of the causes of the great financial crisis of 2007-08 (Bolton and Samama, 2013) . Following this debate, some European countries like France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands promulgated laws that either introduced or modified the discipline of loyalty shares.
Loyalty shares constitute another way of departing from the typical one-share onevote recommendation contained in corporate governance codes around the world. Indeed, loyalty shares create deviations from this principle, and such deviations have been found to favor tunnelling (Johnson et al., 2000) , reduce market discipline in takeover contests (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988) , and be in general detrimental to shareholder value (Bebchuk et al., 2000; Adams and Ferreira, 2008) . Corporate governance activists and institutional investors heavily promoted one-share one-vote in the 1990s and early 2000s, resulting in a wave of dual class unifications (Hauser and 2 Lauterbach, 2004; Lauterbach and Pajuste, 2015) . 1,2 While proponents of loyalty shares stress their bright side, i.e. the supposed ability to mitigate short-termism, a dark side exists as well. Controlling shareholders can use loyalty shares as a control enhancing mechanism to insulate themselves from market pressures and weaken minority investors. If the loyalty rewards are not properly designed, the benefits of incentivizing long-term investment could be outweighed by the costs originating from the increased separation between ownership and control (Bolton and Samama, 2013) . This concern is particularly relevant in Continental Europe, where ownership is often concentrated, and family control is common (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Lins, Volpin, Wagner, 2013) .
In this paper, we examine how controlling shareholders adopt and exploit loyalty shares. This question is particularly relevant because of the long-term horizon of controlling shareholders. Families are known to provide firms with patient capital (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006) . In this type of situation, the availability of loyalty shares may generate incentives that are opposite to those that loyalty share advocates have in mind. Loyalty shares may help controlling shareholders to control the firm with less 1 At the same time, an attempt to ban dual class firms at the European level (see the European Commission "High Level Group of Company Law Experts" report, also known as Winter report, HLG, 2002 a and b) was aborted, as mixed evidence on their effects on total shareholder value was reported by the survey studies commissioned by the European Commission (Adams and Ferreira, 2008; Burkart and Lee, 2008) . 2 Dual class shares and CEMs in general have recently gained new momentum. Famous tech giants such as Google, Facebook, LinkedIn and Alibaba have adopted multiple voting shares to keep their founders in control. In 2018, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange overturned rules barring the listing of companies with multiple voting rights in order to avoid losing tech companies to US stock exchanges.
3 capital invested, thus increasing the separation between ownership and control, or to strengthen their grip on the firm. Controlling shareholders' usage of loyalty shares is also important to understand the behavior of institutional investors. Enhanced voting rights may be less valuable to institutional investors when a controlling shareholder already exists, and this may reduce the effectiveness of loyalty shares as a solution to shorttermism.
To study the effect of loyalty shares in an environment dominated by large shareholders, we focus on Italy. Italy is characterized by a strong prevalence of firms with concentrated ownership. The largest shareholder is typically a family (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Barontini and Caprio, 2006) , that has historically relied on control enhancing mechanisms like dual-class shares (Caprio and Croci, 2008) . Since the controlling family on average owns more than 50 percent of the firm's equity, Italy provides an ideal venue to analyze the behavior of these shareholders, in a situation where they already have majority control, and therefore the introduction of an additional control-enhancement mechanism (CEM) does not appear at first sight to be markedly valuable to them.
Differently from France, where loyalty shares already existed before the Loi Florange of 2014, 3 this mechanism was not available to Italian listed firms before 2014. This provides a perfect setting because their introduction represents a complete novelty for 4 Italian firms and their shareholders. To put it differently, we can safely assume that the decisions about loyalty shares have not been influenced by prior beliefs.
We investigate the adoption decisions of Italian listed firms after the introduction of the new law in 2014 which allowed them, through an extraordinary general meeting resolution, to turn voting shares into loyalty shares rewarding "loyal" shareholders with an additional vote per share. 4 Forty-five Italian listed firms (approximately, one-fifth of all firms listed on the main segment of Borsa Italiana) introduced this new device between 2015 and 2018. The peak of adoptions was reached in 2015, with 18 instances.
After that the number of new adoptions stabilized at around 9 per year).
By contrasting the sample of Italian listed firms adopting loyalty shares to the universe of Italian listed firms, we find that family status increases the likelihood of adopting the new voting system. This result is economically sizeable, as family firms are from 2 to 4 times more likely to opt for loyalty shares than non-family firms. Therefore, despite already having majority control, these families exploit the new tool to strengthen their grip on the firm. We also report some evidence that majority shareholders use loyalty shares to decrease their holdings in the controlled firms without affecting their control of voting rights. Since the largest shareholder is typically a family and usually under-diversified, decreasing their equity stake without losing control allows them to reduce idiosyncratic risk. Family firms may also be prone to adopting loyalty shares in 5 preparation for an expected equity-diluting operation, such as a merger or an equity issue. Our evidence does not support this conjecture, as the decrease in equity capital held is not correlated with ownership-diluting events like acquisitions and seasoned equity offerings. In fact, we find no evidence that loyalty shares are introduced to preserve family control in times of external growth or financing. Overall, we interpret these findings as evidence that families exploit loyalty shares to reduce their exposure to firm-specific investment while preserving control, but not to foster external growth.
While controlling shareholders have welcomed loyalty shares, institutional investors in Italian listed companies have voiced a negative reaction at shareholder meetings calling for their adoption but have not voted with their feet. As in France (Belot et al., 2018) , in fact, we document that institutional investors opposed loyalty shares and voted against their introduction at the shareholder meeting. However, even if institutional investors have manifested discontent with loyalty shares, we do not observe a negative market reaction either at the announcement or at the adoption, and we find no evidence of a decrease in their stake in adopting firms. While institutional investors did not favor the adoption of loyalty shares, their adoption did not affect their investment decisions either. This evidence differs from Bourveau et al. (2018) , who show a decrease in institutional ownership, especially foreign investors.
Our paper extends and complements previous work on loyalty shares that mostly focuses on France, where companies have been using loyalty shares since 1966, and the Loi Florange of 2014 made loyalty shares the default choice for listed companies. In 6 contemporaneous papers, Belot et al. (2019) and Bourveau et al. (2018) study the effects of this law on French companies. Belot et al. (2019) document that family firms were more likely to adopt loyalty shares in the pre-Loi Florange regime. They document that loyalty shares were popular in France and almost two-thirds of companies have introduced them since 1966. However, Belot et al. (2019) are mostly concerned with the post-2014 period, examining the choice of opting out of loyalty shares. They find that opting-out has a negative effect on firm value and interpret this result as suggesting that shareholders have a positive view of loyalty shares. This result is not confirmed by Bourveau et al. (2018) , who show a positive reaction to successful opt-out votes. Our results support neither of these views for the Italian market. While family firms are eager to introduce loyalty shares in Italy, there is no evidence of a wealth effect at the adoption. The different results for these two countries, characterized by relatively similar institutions and legal origin (La Porta et al., 1998) as well as ownership (Faccio and Lang, 2002) , suggests that investors behave differently depending on the situation they face. Differently from the French law, which automatically grants double-voting rights to all shares of listed firms unless shareholders decide to opt out, in Italy firms must voluntarily adopt loyalty shares. These papers, including ours, are part of a growing literature on loyalty shares. Ginglinger and Hamon (2012) find that loyalty shares have no impact on the liquidity of large companies, but they increase the liquidity of small caps. Becht et al. (2018) analyze the 120 largest French companies included in the SBF120 index and report that 70 percent of them decided to opt out when forced to introduce loyalty shares in 2014, thus supporting the Coase theorem.
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The remainder of the paper continues as follows. In the next section we describe the institutional background, the data we use in our study and the descriptive statistics of our sample. Section 3 reports and discusses the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
Institutional background to loyalty shares and data
Institutional background
Until 20 years ago, Italy was one of the European countries where ownershipcontrol (O/C) separation was more severe, thanks to an extensive use of control enhancement mechanisms (CEMs), such as shareholder agreements, pyramidal groups, non-voting shares, and often a combination of these (Faccio and Lang, 2002) . In recent years, these CEMs have lost their appeal and Italian companies have relied progressively less on them for several reasons. A new stricter discipline on related party transactions in 2010 (CONSOB regulation 17221/2010) limited the private benefits potentially delivered by shareholder agreements. Besides, a change in the tax regimes of dividends paid to controlling companies in 2007 has reduced the appeal of pyramidal groups. Eventually, non-voting shares have become less attractive for two main reasons. Firstly, institutional investors and hedge funds have progressively directed their investments to one-share one-vote companies. Secondly, the dramatic drop in interest rates made the dividend privilege offered to such shareholders extremely expensive for the issuing firms (Bigelli and Croci, 2013) , and many companies decided to return to a one-share one-vote equity structure through a dual class unification (Bigelli et al., 2011) . As a result, the percentage of listed firms using non-voting shares dropped from 31.9 in 1998 to a modest 7.4 percent in 2017 (CONSOB, 2018 
Mechanics of loyalty shares
Under the Italian regulation, the granting of enhanced voting rights does not create any new special category of shares. All shares meeting the requirements set forth by the law and by the issuers by-laws benefit from the increase. This increase is up to two votes and it is applicable only to those shares which the same shareholder holds for at least two consecutive years without interruption. The transfer of the shares automatically terminates the enhanced voting rights. Shareholders opting for enhanced voting rights must be registered in a special register held by the issuer. Such enhanced voting rights then come into effect two years from this date for shareholders of already 9 listed companies, and immediately for companies that opt in at the time of their IPO.
Loyalty shares can be introduced by an amendment of the company charter approved by the extraordinary shareholder meeting with a two-thirds resolution majority, 6 and can be reverted in the same way.
Loyalty shares enhance shareholders' voting rights only in particular circumstances. In fact, they carry up to two votes only at the shareholder meetings, and not when such votes should be counted for exercising some specific minority rights, such as calling a meeting, suing directors, etc. Finally, loyalty shares may affect control contests. In fact, shareholders can exceed the threshold that triggers a totalitarian takeover in compliance with the equal opportunity rule because of the double voting power of their shares. However, when a takeover attempt is pending, loyalty shares do not allow the extra vote.
Data
Our analysis covers the period from 2015 to the end of 2018. The sample period begins in 2015 because loyalty shares were introduced in Italy on August 11, 2014
(Development Decree, Act 116/2014 converted in Law 116/2014), and companies started to adopt the new voting system in January 2015. 7 We collect information on the 10 introduction of loyalty shares from the Italian market regulator (CONSOB) website, which maintains an updated list of companies adopting loyalty shares. 8 Forty-five companies adopted loyalty shares between 2015 and 2018, six of which announced the adoption at the time of their IPO. We manually collect information on the announcement date using internet searches. Data on the outcome of the general meeting vote, and the percentage of voting capital are obtained from the companies' official filings. .7)). This is the first preliminary evidence of the fact that the perceived benefits of the new voting systems are possibly different between the majority shareholder and the minorities.
Results
Introduction of loyalty shares
Institutional investors consistently voted against the introduction of loyalty shares.
From reading the board proposals to the shareholder meetings on the adoption of loyalty shares, we find that the main official reason for their introduction is to build shareholder loyalty and favor their long-term involvement in the firm's decision-making process.
Conversely, in some company meetings institutional investors highlight the risk of agency costs brought about by a larger separation between ownership. In many cases they also emphasize that the augmented voting stake of the first shareholder may end up completely controlling the extraordinary shareholder meeting. Figure 1 shows the hypothetical change of the voting capital in the hands of the first shareholder once the vote of loyalty shares was doubled, assuming that no other shareholders registered their shares in the special register held by the company.
Please insert figure 1 here
As of December 31, 2018, this assumption is not far from reality, as from checking this register (publicly available on the company's website) we report that in 6 cases only one shareholder other than the first appears. 12 The median voting capital of the first shareholder would increase to about 70 percent (from 54 percent), well above the 66.67 percent threshold which would guarantee control of the extraordinary shareholder meeting. As we will report later in the paper, however, there is evidence of a reduction in the holdings of the first shareholder following the adoption of loyalty shares, consistent with the hypothesis that families are under-diversified and seek to reduce idiosyncratic risk without losing control. 
Comparative analysis of companies with loyalty shares
Please insert table 3 here
Firms with loyalty shares are significantly smaller on average, both considering accounting (total assets and sales) and market variables (market capitalization).
However, when looking at medians, differences narrow considerably, and loyalty share companies appear instead to be larger (€309 v. €147 million considering market capitalization). This is because size is considerably skewed to the right, with the first 3, 5, and 15 companies counting for about 25, 34, and 60 percent of the total market capitalization (as of the end of December 2018, according to information provided by the Italian Stock Exchange), respectively, and none of them opted for the loyalty shares.
Firms adopting loyalty shares are slightly more valued by the market (median market-tobook equal to 1.7x vs. 1.4x) and cash-richer (12.6 percent of the total assets vs. 9.7 percent). Also, they invest more (the differential median CAPEX is 0.6 percent of total assets), and they are more profitable, both considering ROE (9.6 vs. 5.3 percent) and ROA (9.2 vs. 6.9 percent), and more able to pay out dividends (66 vs. 56 percent). In a nutshell, companies with loyalty shares are more profitable, generate more cash, pay more dividends, invest more, and are more valued by the market.
The second set of variables in 
Likelihood of introducing loyalty shares
We now extend the previous univariate analysis studying the likelihood of adopting loyalty shares in a multivariate setting. Table 4 presents the results of a Cox's proportional hazard regression for the likelihood of adopting loyalty shares (Cox, 1972) .
For each firm, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 in the year in which loyalty shares are adopted. Hazard ratios, rather than coefficients, are reported.
Please insert table 4 here
Model 1 represents our baseline specification, where the likelihood of adopting loyalty shares is explained by the Family control dummy, firm-specific profitability, liquidity, leverage, payout variables, and the Financial dummy. Model 2 replicates model 1 but excludes financial companies, whilst models from 3 to 5 progressively add explanatory variables to model 1. In particular, in model 3 we include ownership variables, such as the voting capital of the first shareholder and that of institutional investors, while in model 4 we also add the voting capital of foreign investors in general.
Model 5 includes corporate governance variables such as the size of the board of directors, the percentage of independent directors, the dummy for a CEO also serving as chairman, and the presence of minority directors. Interestingly, Family control dummy is strongly significant in all of our models. It is also very relevant from an economic point of view.
Family-controlled companies are 2 (= 3.01 -1) to 3.8 (= 4.8 -1) times more likely to adopt loyalty shares than their non-family-controlled counterparts, depending on which model we consider. This is consistent with the univariate analysis reported in the previous table 3. As the controlling family is generally under-diversified and bears significant idiosyncratic risk, adopting loyalty shares in such companies would be compatible with a strategy of liquidating a portion of their shares without reducing their control.
There is no evidence that other firm-specific variables significantly affect the likelihood of adopting loyalty shares, except for the size of the board (positive effect) and the presence of directors appointed by minority shareholders (negative effect). Thus, while institutional investor ownership per se does not discourage the introduction of loyalty shares, directors nominated from minority lists decrease the probability of their adoption.
Market reaction
Loyalty shares contribute to increasing the wedge between ownership and control, and in turn they may generate incremental agency costs. If this is the case, their introduction may trigger a negative market reaction. Table 5 presents the results of an event study at the announcement and at the adoption of loyalty shares.
Please insert table 5 here
We have computed CARs using three event windows, that is [- 
Institutional investors
The first two models of table 6 focus on institutional investor holdings and their dynamics, as a function of firm-specific variables.
Please insert table 6 here
Models 1 and 2 regress the institutional investors' voting stake in Italian listed companies on variables at firm level, along with the Financial dummy. Larger and more profitable companies are more likely to attract the investment of institutional investors.
Institutional investors have a preference for liquidity (Gompers and Metrick, 2001) , and family-controlled companies have less free float. Also, for family-controlled companies the risk of expropriating minorities is higher, and the probability of influencing the management is lower. For both these reasons, institutional investors tend to invest less in family-controlled companies (Fernando et al., 2014) . The variable Board size is slightly significant and positive. Finally, after correcting for size and profitability, the Loyalty dummy is insignificant. We also investigate the investment behavior of institutional investors following the adoption of loyalty shares through the inclusion of the binary variable Loyalty dummy post. This variable takes the value of 1 in the post-adoption period for companies opting for introducing loyalty shares. Evidence shows that institutional investors do not reduce their holding in such companies, as this variable is insignificant in both models.
This evidence allows us to conclude that institutional investors do not shy away from loyalty share companies, as profitability, growth, and the payout policy of such companies prevail over the risk of increased agency costs brought about by the new control-enhancing mechanism.
First shareholder
We now investigate the behavior of the first shareholder after the introduction of loyalty shares. Since the first shareholder is typically a family, and its wealth is highly concentrated in the firm's equity, loyalty shares may allow the under-diversified controlling shareholder to reduce the firm stake without losing control. The last two models of table 6 show the results of such an empirical analysis. We regress the largest shareholder's voting stake on firm-level variables and the Financial dummy. 13
Controlling for other firm characteristics, the Loyalty dummy is positive and strongly significant, as the stake of the first shareholder is about 6 percent larger in firms adopting loyalty shares. Financial companies have instead a more dispersed ownership structure. The variable Loyalty dummy post is negative and significant in both models, suggesting that the stake of the first shareholder is lower for companies adopting loyalty shares in the post-adoption period. The coefficient of this variable suggests that, controlling for other firm-specific variables, the first shareholder reduces his/her holdings by 5 to 6 percent after loyalty shares are in place, depending on the specification.
Please insert figure 2 here
Figure 2 zooms in on the behavior of the first shareholder around the adoption of loyalty shares. The three box plots depict the distribution of the first shareholder's stake at years t -1, t, and t + 1, respectively, year t being the year in which loyalty shares are introduced. It is apparent that the holdings of the first shareholder progressively decrease. Considering medians, the common equity of the first shareholder passes from 54 percent to 49 percent within two years. After doubling the votes, assuming that minority shareholders remain completely passive, a 49 percent median common equity capital means about 66 percent of the voting capital (= (49 × 2)/(100 + 49)). This confirms the evidence that the first shareholder surrenders some shares, but still reinforces their control over the company.
Equity-dilutive corporate transactions
Another motivation for adopting loyalty shares could be the desire of families to retain control in case of ownership-diluting events, like acquisitions and seasoned equity offerings. Despite the short time span, we check whether the introduction of loyalty shares affects the likelihood of completing an acquisition or issuing new equity capital in the subsequent year. To this purpose we run two logit regressions, where the explanatory variables are the same as in tables 6.
The first regression uses the completion of at least one acquisition in year t + 1 as the dependent variable, where t is the year when loyalty shares are adopted. The second regression employs instead the completion of a seasoned equity offering in year t + 1 as the dependent variable. Untabulated results show that the Loyalty dummy is insignificant in all specifications. This evidence rules out the hypothesis that loyalty shares are introduced to preserve family control in times of external growth or financing.
Conclusion
Since shareholder engagement over a longer-term horizon is considered beneficial to reducing short-termism and favoring firm value in the long term, loyalty shares have begun to be seen by regulators as a possible instrument to achieve such an objective and are progressively becoming more internationally widespread. In the wake of this surging trend, in 2014 France made loyalty shares mandatory (unless firms decide to opt-out),
Italy introduced them for the first time, and in 2019 Belgium approved a company law reform which allows their introduction on a voluntary basis in 2020. In the present paper, in the ideal setting of the Italian market, characterized by concentrated ownership and family firms, we study the four years that followed the introduction of loyalty shares (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) and show that 45 Italian listed firms (about one fifth of those listed on the main stock market segment) have already taken advantage of this new control enhancement mechanism. The results of our investigation on the population of Italian companies adopting loyalty shares show that they are significantly more likely to be introduced by firms with a majority shareholder, a more concentrated ownership structure, and controlled by a family. We report no evidence of a negative market reaction at the announcement's adoption (and at the shareholders' meeting), and no reduction in the holdings by institutional investors, though they generally vote against their introduction. Their vote "with their hands" was not followed by a "vote with their feet," probably as family firms introducing loyalty shares are significantly more profitable, faster growing, more cash generating and pay more cash dividends than other firms. Giving a double voting power after two years of continuous holding, loyalty shares not only may favor long term shareholder investments, but may help controlling shareholders to strengthen control over their firms, engage more in ownership diluting operations (as merger or equity offerings), and also disinvest part of their stakes without any effect on pre-loyalty control of voting rights. We find that the introduction of loyalty shares help majority shareholders to strengthen their control, as usually almost no other shareholders apply to have their voting rights doubled. Notwithstanding our short available period of analysis, especially after the two-year loyalty period for doubling the voting rights, we find some evidence that controlling shareholders reduce their holdings after loyalty shares are adopted.
The present study should contribute to the scarce existing literature on loyalty shares for a deeper understanding of this new share feature, which could be considered both as an instrument to reduce short termism and as an additional control enhancement mechanism for family firms. When longer time horizons after their introduction become available, future researchers will be able to test the long-term effects of their introduction and verify if they have fulfilled the goal they were meant for. Table 6 -Institutional investors' and first shareholder's common equity capital. The table shows the results of a linear regression for the voting capital of institutional investors (first two models) and the first shareholder (last two models) as a function of the reported explanatory variables. Variables are defined in the appendix. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at firm-level are reported in parentheses. * * * , * * , * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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